Does Estonia Still Need a President?

Rethinking the role, cost and relevance of the presidential institution

Introduction: A question worth asking

Estonia is a parliamentary republic. The Government exercises executive power and is politically accountable to the Riigikogu, while the President of the Republic is the head of state with a range of constitutional, representative and ceremonial responsibilities.

The presidency is part of Estonia's constitutional system, but that does not mean that its continued existence should be beyond discussion. Institutions are created to serve a purpose. They should not be preserved simply because they have existed for a long time, because other countries have them, or because changing them might be inconvenient.

The question is not whether Estonia needs a head of state. Every state needs clear constitutional arrangements and someone or some institution to perform certain functions. The question is whether Estonia needs a separate presidential institution, with its own administration, expenses, privileges and election process, to perform those functions.

Could the same responsibilities be carried out by institutions that already exist?

A small country should be particularly careful about creating additional layers of administration and authority. Every institution should be able to explain why it is necessary and what practical value it provides to the public.

A well-organised state should not aim to have as many institutions as it can afford. It should aim to have only those institutions it genuinely needs.

1. What does the President actually do?

The Estonian President has important constitutional responsibilities. The President represents Estonia internationally, promulgates laws, may refuse to proclaim a law and return it to the Riigikogu for reconsideration, and may ask the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of legislation. The President also has a role in the appointment of senior officials and in the formation of a new Government.

These functions matter. But recognising that the functions matter does not automatically prove that they must all belong to one separate institution headed by a President.

International representation, for example, could be carried out by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and Estonian diplomatic representatives. Legislative and constitutional review functions could be distributed between the Riigikogu and the Supreme Court, with appropriate safeguards. Certain appointments could be made by other constitutional institutions under clearly defined procedures.

Some responsibilities would need to be reassigned carefully, and some constitutional safeguards would have to be redesigned. This would require constitutional amendments, not simply an administrative decision.

But it is worth asking why the current arrangement should be regarded as the only possible one.

The President's role is often described as a balancing, unifying or stabilising force. These are valuable qualities, but they are also difficult to measure. How much practical benefit does the separate institution provide? What would be lost if its functions were allocated elsewhere? And could those functions be performed just as effectively, or more transparently, through institutions that already have democratic or constitutional accountability?

There is also a memorable way to describe the nature of the office: an office of being, not an office of doing.

The President is expected to represent the state, embody national continuity and act as a constitutional guardian. Yet the actual governing and policy-making responsibilities lie elsewhere. Is maintaining a separate institution justified primarily by its symbolic presence?

2. Constitutional safeguards and the argument for independence

One of the strongest arguments in favour of retaining the presidency is that the President can act independently of day-to-day party politics. The office can provide continuity when governments change and may serve as a constitutional counterbalance when political institutions come into conflict.

That argument deserves serious consideration. A President can refuse to proclaim a law, refer a constitutional question to the Supreme Court and play a role in government formation. These are not meaningless powers.

However, independence does not have to depend on the existence of a President. Constitutional independence can also be protected through clearly defined responsibilities, fixed appointment procedures, judicial review, parliamentary oversight and transparent decision-making.

If Estonia ever considered abolishing the presidency, it would have to examine every presidential responsibility individually. No constitutional function should simply disappear. The aim would be to redistribute responsibilities without weakening the rule of law or creating dangerous concentrations of power.

For example, the Speaker of the Riigikogu could perform certain formal representative functions. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister could take on additional responsibilities in international representation. The Supreme Court could retain and, where necessary, assume clearly defined constitutional review responsibilities. Appointments and government-formation procedures could be redesigned with appropriate checks and balances.

The question is therefore not whether the President has duties. The question is whether those duties require a separate President.

3. The conduct of the person holding the office

The presidency is not only an institution on paper. It is also represented by a person whose conduct can influence public confidence in the constitutional order.

An example worth examining is the incident involving President Kersti Kaljulaid and Marti Kuusik in April 2019.

On 29 April 2019, when Kuusik was due to take the oath of office as Minister of Foreign Trade and Information Technology, Kaljulaid left the Riigikogu chamber. At the time, allegations of domestic violence concerning Kuusik had been reported in the media.

Kuusik denied the allegations. In May 2021, Viru County Court acquitted him, finding that his guilt had not been proved. The prosecution appealed, but in May 2022 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal, and the acquittal entered into force.

After the first court judgment, Kaljulaid issued a public apology to Kuusik for leaving the chamber during his inauguration.

My concern is not to make claims about what happened privately between the people involved. Nor is it to suggest that an acquittal establishes every possible detail of an event. The relevant point is a fundamental principle of the rule of law: a person who has been acquitted must be treated as innocent of the offence. An accusation is not a conviction, and an acquittal should not leave a permanent asterisk or suspicion attached to a person's name.

The presumption of innocence is not a technicality that applies only in courtrooms. It is a constitutional principle that should guide public institutions and those who represent them.

A President has a particular responsibility to respect that principle. The President is expected to stand above political disputes and to represent the constitutional values of the state, including the rights of individuals.

Kaljulaid's apology was addressed to Kuusik personally. However, in my view, the wider constitutional concern deserved a more explicit acknowledgement: public office should never be used in a way that appears to prejudge a person before the legal process has reached its conclusion.

This is not a claim that a court found the President to have violated the Constitution. It is a question about the standard of conduct and constitutional restraint expected from the person occupying the highest representative office in the country.

If the presidency is justified partly by its role as a guardian of constitutional values, then the conduct of the person holding that office must be measured against those same values.

4. Who reaches the highest office — and by what route?

There is another question worth asking when considering who reaches the highest public offices: what experience has that person had of earning public trust?

In ordinary democratic life, people who enter politics often begin at local or municipal level. They stand before voters, explain their ideas, face questions, compete with other candidates, sometimes lose, learn and try again. This does not guarantee good leadership, but it provides experience of democratic accountability.

Yet people can reach the highest offices through appointment, political succession, personal prominence or particular political circumstances, without first having to earn a mandate in an ordinary public election.

Previous experience in elected public office

Looking at Estonia's Presidents since the restoration of independence, an interesting pattern emerges:

• Lennart Meri (1992–2001): Before becoming President, he had served as Foreign Minister and Ambassador. These were appointed positions; he had no previous elected public office.

• Arnold Rüütel (2001–2006): Had experience in elected public office, including membership of the Supreme Council and the Riigikogu.

• Toomas Hendrik Ilves (2006–2016): Had been elected to the Riigikogu and the European Parliament.

• Kersti Kaljulaid (2016–2021): Had held senior public and international positions, including membership of the European Court of Auditors, but had no previous elected public office.

• Alar Karis (2021–2026): Had held several senior institutional positions, including Director of the National Audit Office and university rector, but had no previous elected public office.

• Ülle Madise (elected 2026): Had served as Chancellor of Justice and held other senior public positions, but had no previous elected public office.

This means that four of Estonia's six Presidents since the restoration of independence had not previously held elected public office.

That fact does not automatically make them unsuitable for the presidency. Nor does election to public office guarantee wisdom, integrity or good leadership. But it raises a legitimate question: how important is experience of standing before voters, earning their trust and being accountable to them before reaching the country's highest office?

A wider question: the United States and Russia

This question is not unique to Estonia. It can also be raised in relation to other countries, although their political systems and presidential powers are very different.

For example, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, like Kersti Kaljulaid and Ülle Madise, had not previously held elected public office before first becoming President. This does not make their positions or political circumstances equivalent. The comparison is narrower: all four reached the highest office without first having to earn a mandate through election to another public position.

Putin's route was different from Trump's. Boris Yeltsin appointed Putin Prime Minister in 1999. When Yeltsin resigned on 31 December of that year, Putin became Acting President, before subsequently winning the presidential election in March 2000. Trump, by contrast, entered the presidency directly through election in 2016, without having previously held elected public office.

The phenomenon I call "position laundering"

I would call this phenomenon position laundering, by analogy with money laundering.

A person who has not previously earned a mandate through election to public office can reach the highest position through appointment, succession or political circumstances. Once in office, the formal status of that position may give the impression that the person has passed through the same democratic process as someone who has built a political career by standing for election, facing voters and earning their trust.

But these are not necessarily the same things.

The routes taken by Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump illustrate different versions of this question. Their political systems and presidential powers are vastly different, but both examples raise a question about the experience of electoral accountability before reaching the highest office.

I do not suggest that prior election to public office is an absolute requirement for every person who becomes a head of state. Nor does a person without such experience necessarily lack professional ability or public-service experience. The point is that democratic accountability should matter, particularly when someone is entrusted with a position of great authority.

The question for Estonia remains: should we maintain a separate presidency, and if so, what democratic value does the current method of selecting its occupant provide?

5. Is the presidential election genuinely democratic in spirit?

Estonia's presidential election system is legal and constitutionally defined. The President is elected first by the Riigikogu. If the Riigikogu fails to elect a President after three rounds, the process moves to an Electoral College consisting of members of the Riigikogu and representatives of local councils.

But legality and democratic legitimacy are not always identical questions.

The 2016 election provides an example. The Riigikogu failed to elect a President, and the Electoral College also failed to produce a winner. The election then returned to the Riigikogu. On 3 October 2016, Kersti Kaljulaid was the sole candidate in the final vote and was elected with 81 votes.

The result was legally valid. Nevertheless, the process raises a question about the quality of democratic choice available to the public and to the representatives involved. A candidate can be elected in accordance with the law while the process still offers limited meaningful choice.

I would have preferred a different approach. If there is only one candidate, why should the election proceed as though voters or representatives have been offered a genuine choice? I believe there should be at least two candidates, and that the Electoral College should have a meaningful opportunity to choose between them.

There should also be sufficient time for candidates to introduce themselves to the public, explain their views, answer questions and take part in open debate. A month-long period of public discussion would help citizens understand who the candidates are and what they stand for. It would also reduce the risk of an unfamiliar candidate appearing at the last moment, with little opportunity for public scrutiny.

The 2026 election illustrates that this concern has not disappeared. Ülle Madise was the sole candidate registered for the Riigikogu vote on 2 September 2026. She received 71 votes, exceeding the required 68, while seven ballots were left unmarked.

The law had been amended earlier in 2026 to bring forward the nomination deadline and give candidates more opportunity to introduce themselves before voting. That was a useful procedural change. However, the election still resulted in a single candidate being elected in the first round.

This does not mean that the election was illegal. It was conducted under the law. But it again raises the distinction between a legally correct procedure and a process that offers the public a meaningful choice between candidates.

Legality establishes whether an election follows the rules. Democratic legitimacy also depends on the quality of the choice those rules make possible.

And there is a more fundamental question behind all these procedural debates: if the presidential institution itself is necessary, why should so much attention be devoted to designing a better way to select the person who occupies it, rather than first asking whether the institution is needed at all?

6. What does the presidency cost?

The presidency is not free. It requires an office, staff, premises, security, transport, representation, administration and other resources.

According to the 2026 state budget explanatory materials, the original budget allocation for the Office of the President of the Republic was approximately €7.307 million.

That is a substantial amount of public money. Estonia has many competing needs: education, teachers' salaries, public safety, healthcare, infrastructure, national defence and support for people who need it.

It is important to be precise here. Abolishing the presidency would not automatically release the entire amount for other purposes. Some responsibilities would have to be transferred to other institutions, and those institutions would incur costs of their own. Some expenses could be reduced; others would remain in a different form.

Nevertheless, the budget raises a legitimate question about priorities. What tangible public benefit does this separate institution provide in return for the resources it consumes?

And the argument is not only about money.

Even if Estonia had enough money to fund every desirable service, it would not follow that the state should create or maintain every institution it can afford. Unnecessary institutions bring additional administration, bureaucracy, overlapping responsibilities, procedures, hierarchy and special privileges. They can make the state more complicated and less transparent.

The purpose of public institutions should be to serve citizens, not to preserve their own existence.

A state should not measure its success by the number of offices, officials or institutions it maintains. It should measure its success by how effectively it serves the people.

7. Institutions, hierarchy and equality

A separate presidency also represents a particular institutional hierarchy. It has its own administration, formal privileges, public visibility and ceremonial status.

There is nothing inherently wrong with having institutions or public officials who carry special responsibilities. Some roles require specific authority, resources and protections.

But every privilege and every additional layer of hierarchy should have a clear justification. The state should be careful not to create unnecessary distinctions between those who govern and those whom they serve.

This is not an argument that the presidency is a major cause of economic inequality. It is a broader question about how public institutions distribute status, resources and authority, and whether those arrangements are justified by the public interest.

The more institutions a state creates, the more it must spend maintaining them and coordinating their activities. Responsibilities can become fragmented, decision-making more complicated and accountability less clear.

A simpler state is not necessarily a weaker state. In many cases, it can be more transparent, more efficient and easier for citizens to understand.

8. What could replace the presidency?

Abolishing the presidency would require careful constitutional reform. It would not be enough simply to close the President's Office and assume that all responsibilities could be absorbed without consequences.

A serious proposal would need to examine every constitutional function and decide where it should go.

For example:

• The Speaker of the Riigikogu could take on certain formal and representative duties associated with the head of state.

• The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister could assume additional responsibilities in international representation.

• The Supreme Court could continue to perform constitutional review, with any necessary changes to procedures and safeguards.

• The Riigikogu and other existing institutions could assume clearly defined responsibilities for appointments and other formal decisions.

• Government formation, emergency powers and national defence arrangements would need to be reviewed to ensure that no constitutional gaps or excessive concentrations of power were created.

These are possible directions for discussion, not a complete constitutional reform plan. Each would need legal analysis and public debate.

The important point is that the functions of the presidency and the institution of the presidency are not necessarily the same thing. A function can be necessary without requiring a separate institution to perform it.

9. We do not live in the 1930s

Estonia has its own constitutional history and traditions. History deserves respect, and institutions often reflect the circumstances in which they were created.

But we do not live in the 1930s, nor should we organise the state as though the political and social realities of that era still define our needs.

Estonia restored its independence in 1991 and adopted its current Constitution in 1992. Our society, economy, international position and expectations of public administration have changed considerably since then.

Tradition deserves respect, but it is not an argument in itself.

The question is not whether an institution once had a reason to exist, but whether it still serves a necessary purpose today.

Conclusion: What kind of state do we want?

The debate about the presidency should not be reduced to whether we like or dislike a particular President. It should not be about personalities, political preferences or individual controversies.

It should be about the organisation of the state and the needs of its citizens.

Does Estonia need a separate President to perform the functions currently assigned to that office? Could those functions be carried out by existing institutions, with appropriate constitutional safeguards? Does the current arrangement provide enough practical, democratic and constitutional value to justify its cost and complexity?

These are legitimate questions in a democratic society.

A well-organised state should not aim to have as many institutions as it can afford. It should aim to have only those institutions it genuinely needs.

The purpose of government is not to maintain offices, titles, traditions or privileges for their own sake. It is to serve the people.

Perhaps it is time for Estonia to ask, openly and without fear of challenging tradition:

Does Estonia still need a President?

Author's note on the use of AI

This article was developed with substantial assistance from artificial intelligence (AI), including help with research, fact-checking, structure and editing. The ideas, questions, opinions and overall argument are the author's own. The author remains responsible for the final text and its claims.

Sources and further reading

The Constitution and presidential election system

• Constitution of the Republic of Estonia

• President of the Republic Election Act

• Official results: 2016 presidential election

• Official results: 2026 presidential election

• Riigikogu: changes to the presidential election procedure, 25 February 2026

• Should the Estonian people be involved in electing the president? — ERR, 7 September 2026 — public debate about the transparency and democratic legitimacy of the election process.

The 2019 Kuusik incident and subsequent court proceedings

• Riigikogu: Ministers took their oaths of office, 29 April 2019

• ERR: President issues apology to former minister cleared of domestic violence, 28 May 2021

• ERR: Marti Kuusik acquittal enters into force, 9 May 2022

• Commentary on the presumption of innocence under §22 of the Constitution

The cost of the presidency

• Estonian Ministry of Finance: 2026 State Budget

• 2026 State Budget Explanatory Memorandum

Presidents of Estonia

• Official list of Estonia's heads of state

• Official biography of President Ülle Madise